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Police officers are regularly required to make judgements of memories, however
little is known about how they make these judgements. Research shows that police
officers often rely on beliefs about memory that are not in line with scientific
knowledge, meaning that flawed judgements of memory evidence may be being
made. In this paper, we describe a recent empirical study that has quantified police
officers’ beliefs about memory and apply the findings to Commissioner of Police
of the Metropolis v DSD, showing how decision making may be driven partly by
erroneous beliefs about memory.
Introduction
Very little is known about the way in which police officers make judgements of
the memory-based evidence they encounter when a victim makes a complaint of
criminal wrongdoing.1 Indeed, it has been proposed that individuals often rely on
their own common-sense beliefs about memory to make such judgements and that
this may be at odds with the scientific understanding of how memory works.
Erroneous judgements of memory evidence in criminal cases can have devastating
consequences, from false accusations and convictions, to victims’ complaints
failing to proceed through the criminal justice system because their accounts are
not believed. Flawed judgements of memory evidence are particularly concerning
in cases involving complaints of rape and sexual assault, when frequently, the
victim’s memories of the offence are the only, or primary evidence upon which
1Although a great deal of research has been done to investigate factors that influence police decision-making, (for
example in the context of rape cases see S.A. Alderden and S.E. Ullman, “Gender Difference or Indifference? Detective
Decision Making in Sexual Assault Cases” (2012) 27(1) Journal of Interpersonal Violence 3; E.C. Barrett and C.
Hamilton-Giachritsis, “The victim as a means to an end: detective decision-making in a simulated investigation of
attempted rape” (2013) 10 Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 200; E. Sleath and R. Bull,
“Police perceptions of rape victims and the impact on case decisionmaking: A systematic review” (2017) 34Aggression
and Violent Behavior 102), very little of this has focused on police judgements of memory evidence.
827[2019] Crim. L.R., Issue 10 © 2019 Thomson Reuters
officers base their decisions about how to direct the investigation. Further, rape
cases have a very high attrition rate, with a conviction rate of as low as 7 per cent,2
and the extent to which officers’ errors in judgingmemory evidencemay contribute
to that problem is not currently understood.
In a recent large-scale investigation of beliefs about memory, Akhtar et al.3
argue that police officers and the public both hold a similar constellation of beliefs
about memory, termed the “common-sense memory belief system” (CSMBS).
These beliefs, Akhtar et al. argue, are often contradictory, unsupported and refuted
by the current scientific understanding of memory. In this article, we take the
CSMBS and apply it to the facts of Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v
DSD4 (hereinafter DSD), a case brought against the Metropolitan Police Service
by two victims of the “black cab rapist”, John Worboys, for failures in the police
investigations of their respective rape complaints. In doing so we are the first to
identify aspects of the decision-making in DSD that was likely to have arisen
because of officers’ reliance on the CSMBS. This analysis is particularly significant
in the context of police decision-making because police officers are the initial
gatekeepers to the criminal justice system5 and they exercise extensive discretion
when deciding how to deal with the cases that come to their attention.6 The
impressions formed by officers about the credibility and reliability of information
provided in autobiographical accounts are also likely to go largely unchalleged7
and prove highly influential to other decision-makers in the criminal justice system,
such as the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS).8
In the first part of this article we highlight the central role that memory evidence
plays within the criminal justice system. The second part outlines the study
undertaken by Akhtar et al. and analyses the way in which the CSMBS is likely
to impact on police judgements of autobiographical memory accounts provided
by complainants in rape cases. The third part focuses on the case of DSD and
considers the role that the CSMBS is likely to have played in the decision-making
which led to the serious investigative failures identified in that case. The final part
of the article then considers the broader impact of cases such as DSD on rape
victims’ willingness to engage with the criminal justice system and makes some
limited suggestions for training of police officers to help challenge their reliance
on the CSMBS.
2K. Hohl and E.A. Stanko, “Complaints of rape and the criminal justice system: fresh evidence on the attrition
problem in England and Wales” (2015) 12(3) European Journal of Criminology 324.
3S. Akhtar et al., “The ‘common sense’ memory belief system and its implications” (2018) 22(3) Int J Evid Proof
289.
4Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11; [2018] 2 W.L.R. 895.
5D.M. Soulliere, “Pathways to attrition: a qualitative comparative analysis of justifications for police designations
of sexual assault complaints” (2005) 10(3) The Qualitative Report 416, 416; K. Hohl and E.A. Stanko, “Complaints
of rape and the criminal justice system: fresh evidence on the attrition problem in England and Wales” (2015) 12(3)
European Journal of Criminology 324, 327.
6L. Artz and D. Smythe, “Losing ground? Making sense of attrition in rape cases” (2007) 22 SA Crime Quarterly
13, 17.
7K.A. McClure, J.J. Myers and K.M. Keefauver, “Witness vetting: What determines detectives’ perceptions of
witness credibility?” (2013) 10 Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 250, 251; M.A. Alderden
and S.E. Ullman, “Creating a more complete and current picture: examining police and prosecutor decision-making
when processing sexual assault cases” (2012) 18(5) Violence Against Women 525, 526.
8 J. Gregory and S. Lees, “Attrition in rape and sexual assault cases” (1996) 36(1) British Journal of Criminology
1, 3; K. Hohl and E.A. Stanko, “Complaints of rape and the criminal justice system: fresh evidence on the attrition
problem in England and Wales” (2015) 12(3) European Journal of Criminology 324, 337.
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Memory overview
It is hard to conceive of a legal system that does not, to some degree, rely on
memory. Memories from victims, defendants and witnesses are present throughout
all aspects of the legal system, from initial interviewing to evidence-giving in
court. Complainants may be required to identify potential perpetrators, witnesses
may be asked to describe full narrative accounts of a specific crime, jurors may
be required to recall evidence presented to them during a trial. In recalling these
types of details and events, individuals are recruiting autobiographical memory,
a memory system that allows specific events to be recalled from across the lifetime.
Information in autobiographical memory is organised hierarchically9 and can
contain a broad range of information from general knowledge about lifetime periods
(e.g. “I lived in London during university”) through to very specific information
about a particular event (e.g. “My bag was snatched from my right shoulder”).
The accuracy of this recall can be, under certain circumstances, relatively high.10
However, what information is encoded (“laid down” in memory) and recalled
about specific events depends on a great deal of factors. Diverse event variables
ranging from the level of light available at a scene through to the duration of an
event can affect where attention is focussed and in turn what is and is not encoded.11
Person variables such as emotion,12 current beliefs, biases and self-concepts shape
memories, affecting what is remembered and indeed misremembered.13 Further,
how memories are elicited, interrogated and rehearsed can additionally affect the
accuracy and inaccuracy of memory.14 As such, autobiographical memories are
not verbatim copies or recordings of an experienced reality but are psychological
representations of the self in the past, shaped and misshaped by many internal and
external processes. Errors can include what happened during the event, who was
involved, when it happened and what was felt at the time. Whilst memory
researchers are aware of these opportunities for error, it is, without objective
evidence, almost impossible for a rememberer to know or even realise which
elements of a memory have been altered.15 This means that often information that
an individual believes to be true may not map onto objective reality, but may be
believed to do so.16
Nevertheless, legal professionals and lay individuals such as jurors are frequently
required to judge both the credibility (believability) of the rememberer and
reliability (accuracy) of their memories.17 However, little is known about the
processes, beliefs or heuristics that might affect or drive these judgements. Akhtar
9M.A. Conway and C.W. Pleydell-Pearce, “The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory
system” (2000) 107(2) Psychol. Rev. 261.
10C. Brewin and B. Andrews, “Memory accused: research on memory error and its relevance to the courtroom”
[2019] Crim. L.R. 748.
11 For a comprehensive list of event variables see A. Kapardis, Psychology and law: A critical introduction
(Cambridge University Press, 2009).
12R.L. Kaplan et al., “Emotion and false memory” (2016) 8(1) Emotion Review 8.
13M.A. Conway, “Memory and the self” (2005) 53(4) J Mem. Lang. 594.
14See C.J. Brainerd and V.F. Reyna, The Science of False Memory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005), Ch.6.
15M.K. Johnson, S. Hashtroudi and D.S. Lindsay, “Source monitoring” (1993) 114(1) Psychol. Bull. 3-, available
at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8346328 [Accessed 19 July 2019]; M.K. Johnson and C.L. Raye, “Reality
monitoring” (1981) 88(1) Psychol. Rev. 67.
16SeeM.A. Conway, “Memory and the self” (2005) 53(4) J. Mem. Lang. 594 for a discussion of “truth” in memory,
and J. Cohen, “Questions of credibility: omissions, discrepancies and errors of recall in the testimony of asylum
seekers” (2001) 13(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 293 for a comprehensive review of memory processes.
17L.V. Justice and H.M.J. Smith, “Memory judgements: the contribution of detail and emotion to assessments of
believability and reliability” (2018) 26(10) Memory 1402.
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et al. proposed that without a scientific framework to refer to, the only basis police
have to judgememories is their own beliefs about memory. These personal beliefs,
termed by Akhtar et al. as “common sense beliefs” are likely to be comprised of
experiences of the individual’s ownmemory, experience and knowledge of others’
memories, cultural norms and beliefs and quite possibly media influences such as
the representation of memory in films, books and art. But are these common sense
beliefs in line with current scientific knowledge about memory? If they are not, it
follows that any decision-making about memory evidence will be flawed, and
often simply wrong.
Despite the advances made to the scientific understanding of human memory,
the courts have maintained stringent limits on the admissibility of expert evidence
based on memory research. Although the Court of Appeal in X (Childhood
Amnesia)18 was willing to admit evidence from a memory expert to explain why
remarkably detailed accounts from a 19-year-old woman of her experiences of
sexual assault as a very young child may be unreliable, they also found it necessary
to issue an extremely weighty caution against the admissibility of such evidence
in other less exceptional cases.19 The result being that what initially appeared as a
somewhat liberal approach to the admissibility of expert evidence to explain the
workings of human memory was in reality only a limited acceptance of memory
research in exceptional cases where a complainant had provided an account of
very early childhood events containing an unusually high level of detail.20
In S (Jonathan Charles)21 the Court considered that the appeals against conviction
did not meet the threshold of exceptionality identified in X and ruled the expert
memory evidence to be inadmissible on that basis.22 In respect of one of the
complainants referred to in the case this was primarily because their accounts
related to memories of sexual assaults which took place in later childhood which
led the Court to conclude that expert evidence was not needed to explain aspects
of memory unaffected by childhood amnesia.23 In S (Jonathan Charles) the Court
also stressed an unwillingness to widen the ambit of the decision in X to admit
expert evidence to explain the normal operation of memory which was likely to
be within normal human experience.24
Underpinning such a restrictive approach to the admissibility ofmemory evidence
appears to be the perceived adequacy of common sense memory beliefs as the
basis upon which to judge memory-based evidence,25 a view that can be observed,
for example, in Lady Justice Hallett’s dictum in E:26
“Some may think that the nature of the evidence put before us, in the final
analysis, comes to little more than common sense. There was no reason to
18X (Childhood Amnesia) [2005] EWCA Crim 1828; [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 10.
19X (Childhood Amnesia) [2005] EWCA Crim 1828; [2006] 1 Cr. App. R. 10 at [47], [48].
20 I. Freckleton, “Expert evidence about memory” (2008) 15(3) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 362, 368.
21 S (Jonathan Charles) [2006] EWCA Crim 1404; [2007] 2 All E.R. 974.
22 S (Jonathan Charles) [2006] EWCA Crim 1404; [2007] 2 All E.R. 974 at [30].
23 S (Jonathan Charles) [2006] EWCA Crim 1404; [200] 2 All E.R. 974 at [27].
24 S (Jonathan Charles) [2006] EWCA Crim 1404; [2007 2 All E.R. 974 at [14], [26] and [30].
25On the courts’ reliance on common sense views of memory see M.A. Conway, “On Being a Memory Expert:
Three Cases” [2013]Memory 1; British Psychology Society Research BoardWorking Group,Guidelines on Memory
and the Law: Recommendations from the Scientific Study of Human Memory (Leicester: British Psychology Society,
2008).
26E [2009] EWCA Crim 1370 at [42]. See also the judgment of Lord Justice Gage in B (T) [2006] EWCA Crim
417; [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 3 at [168]; [2006] Crim. L.R. 745.
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burden the jury, in our view, with conflicting evidence from experts on how
much detail might be expected from a child of 10 trying to remember what
happened when she was aged 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.”
However, evaluating memory evidence is difficult and at a minimum requires
some understanding of the fallability and constructive nature of memory but ideally
requires a comprehensive knowledge of the factors and processes that influence
memories, along with an understanding of the causes of memory errors, distortions
and false memories.
Akhtar et al.’s study
Empirical work has begun to examine the extent to which police officers’ beliefs
about memory are consistent with scientific research on memory. Benton et al.27
surveyed 52 (US) law enforcement personnel regarding their beliefs about the
acquisition and evaluation of eyewitness evidence, with 30 questions covering
topics including line-up accuracy, rate of forgetting, memory malleability and
child witnesses. Broadly, responses given by law enforcement personnel differed
to current scientific knowlege on 18 of the 30 questions (60 per cent), with notable
differences occuring for questions regardingmalleability of memory, characteristics
of memory accuracy, and false memory formation in adults and childhood. These
findings highlight that not only are there discrepancies between law enforcement
beliefs and the scientific understanding of memory, but that these discrepancies
are in some cases very large. Therefore without an understanding of the scientific
nature of memory, flawed judgements of memory evidencemay bemade. However,
with the exception of Benton et al.’s study, no other research has investigated
police beliefs about memory, and none in a British sample. Akhtar et al. therefore
extended Benton et al.’s work by surveying over 500 British police officers, of all
ranks, from two regional police forces. In addition, Akhtar et al. also included a
sample of 240 academic memory researchers or “experts”, at all stages of their
careers, to act as a control group, along with 81 jury-eligible members of the public.
Statements were extended to encompass beliefs about the nature and features of
autobiographical memory. In the following sections, we reiterate the methods and
findings of the study.
Methods
Participants were presented with a questionnaire which contained 31 statements
about human memory. These statements were centred around eight sub-topics,
named: “memory is generally accurate”, “the more details the more accurate the
memory”, “memories can be false”, “memory is like a video”, “emotional intensity
and accuracy”, “trauma and memory”, “childhood memory” and “durability and
reliving trauma” (the statements associated with each can be seen in Table 1). To
prevent the statements biasing the respondents, some were written in line with
current scientific consensus, and some ran contrary. Respondents were required
to indicate their agreement/disagreement to each statement using a 4-point scale:
27T.R. Benton et al., “Eyewitness Memory is Still Not Common Sense: Comparing Jurors, Judges and Law
Enforcement to Eyewitness Experts” (2006) 20(1) Applied Cognitive Psychology 115.
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strongly disagree, disagree, agree, and strongly agree. It was decided not include
a “neither agree nor disagree”/neutral option since such a position usually cannot
be taken in a legal setting. The police were also asked to indicate how many years
they had served, and the memory researchers were asked to indicate how many
years they had studied memory. Basic demographic information was also taken
for all participants (age, sex and highest level of education attained).
Findings
Firstly, the authors wanted to understand whether answering patterns across all
items on the questionnaire differed by group (police, memory researchers and
public). To do this a principal component analysis (PCA) was conducted. PCA is
known as a “dimension reduction” technique; it essentially maps all responses into
a new coordinate system, so that every response to every question from each
participant has a new x,y value. The axes on a PCA plot do not represent anything
physical, they are mathematical constructs calculated to represent variation in the
data. This technique was used since it allows broad patterns to be found in data
and acts as a strong starting point for understanding group differences and
similarities.
Figure 1 shows the output of the PCA and details all responses given to all
statements on the questionnaire, with group membership identified by shape. The
figure shows, broadly, that responses to items on the questionnaire from the police
(cross) overlap considerably with the public (circle), with responses given by
memory researchers (triangle) clustering separately. However, the PCA is only
descriptive and does not statistically showwhether groups are similar or dissimilar
in their answers to items on the questionnaire. Therefore, to understand whether
the police and public showed dissimilar answering patterns to the researchers a
Latent Class Analysis (LCA) was run.
Figure 1. PCA score plot detailing individual responses, categorised by group.
The LCA confirmed that, based on answering patterns, there were two groups
in data—one that comprised the majority (but not all) of the police and the majority
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(but not all) of the public (Class 1) and one that comprised the majority (but not
all) of the memory researchers (Class 2). We further investigated the individuals
in the police, public andmemory researcher groups and found that younger memory
researchers (those aged 25 or younger) were more likely to be placed in Class 1
than respondents aged 36–45 and 46–55, who were more likely to be placed in
Class 2. This shows that training and exposure to memory-based research is critical
in gaining a scientific understanding of memory. No other factors, such as number
of years police had in service, were reliably associated with Class membership.
Nevertheless, this analysis confirmed that police and the public have similar beliefs
about the way in which memory works and that these beliefs were statistically
dissimilar to the beliefs held by memory experts. But how did the two classes
respond to items on the questionnaire?
Although some statements in the questionnaire showed similar likelihoods of
endorsement (probability of a group member agreeing with a given statement),
some substantial differences were found, and these are shown in Figure 2. Broadly
results showed that Class 1 were more likely to endorse items centring around
indictors of accuracy, in particular that detailed, vivid and fluent memory
descriptions are likely to be accurate. This set of beliefs is entirely unsupported
by scientific evidence. Memory research has shown that people tend to remember
a “core” or gist of the original event, with specific and especially peripheral details
not frequently recalled.28 Further, the belief that highly vivid memories are more
accurate than vague memories is not supported by scientific evidence, with very
emotional or vivid memories being as prone to error and forgetting as vague.29
Finally, as noted at the beginning of this paper, memories are time-compressed,
do not preserve fine-grain temporal order and may or may not represent an event
in its original sequence, therefore it would be expected that recall is not temporally
linear, and may be fragmentary when recalled.30
The LCA also showed that Class 1 was more likely than Class 2 to endorse
items surrounding the notion that memory is a literal record of the past. However,
as noted in the introduction, memories are fragmentary, constructive and
error-prone. They are accompanied by emotion and information that is encoded
is highly dependent on the individual’s beliefs and understanding of the world,
attention at the time of the event, and previous experience, amongst many other
things. Memories are psychological representations and are unlike other recording
media. This belief that memory is like a video is strongly refuted in contemporary
memory research.
Also noteworthy is the belief strongly held by Class 1 (.9 likelihood endorsement)
that memories of childhood sexual abuse are likely to contain at least some truth.
As noted, above, traumatic memories and memories of intense emotional
experiences are as error-prone as memories of neutral events31 and as such, follow
the same patterns of forgetting and distortion.
28C. Wells, C.M. Morrison and M.A. Conway, “Adult recollections of childhood memories: What details can be
recalled?” (2014) 67(7) Q. J. Exp. Psychol. 1249.
29 S.A. Christianson, “Emotional stress and eyewitness memory: a critical review” (1992) 112(2) Psychol. Bull.
284.
30M.A. Conway and C.W. Pleydell-Pearce, “The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory
system” (2000) 107(2) Psychol. Rev. 261.
31R.J. McNally, Remembering Trauma (Cambridge, MA, US: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2003).
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Broadly then, response patterns held by Class 1 were not in line with the current
scientific understanding of memory, and as such, the beliefs held by group one
were termed The Common Sense Memory Belief System (CSMBS). Beliefs held
by Class 2, were, in contrast, more supported by scientific evidence, as such these
beliefs were termed The ScientificMemory Belief System (SMBS). The two belief
systems are characterised by a constellation of beliefs and despite some minor
agreement, they are, in the most part, the opposites of each other. Or, in other
words, many common-sense beliefs are contradicted by beliefs based on scientific
research.32
Figure 2. Top 10 items with the largest difference in endorsement. Diamond
points indicate Class 1 (majority public and police), circles indicate Class 2
(majority memory researchers). Higher probability of endorsementmeans higher
probability that an individual in the group will agree with the item.
The effect of the CSMBS on police decision-making in rape
investigations
The findings of Akhtar et al.’s study suggest that police officers are likely to rely
on the CSMBS when making assessments of complainants’ autobiographical
memories across all crime types. However, we consider that the influence of the
CSMBS on officers’ assessments of autobiographical memory is likely to be
heightened in rape cases because the complainant’s account is often the sole or
key piece of evidence indicating that a rape has taken place.33 As a result, officers
are likely to base their decisions about how to proceed with a case largely on the
32See S. Akhtar et al., “The ‘common sense’ memory belief system and its implications” (2018) 22(3) Int. J. Evid.
Proof 289 for a comprehensive discussion.
33K. Hohl and E.A. Stanko, “Complaints of rape and the criminal justice system: fresh evidence on the attrition
problem in England and Wales” (2015) 12(3) European Journal of Criminology 324, 337; K. Ask, “A survey of
police officers’ and prosecutors’ beliefs about crime victim behaviors” (2009) 25(6) Journal of Interpersonal Violence
1132, 1145.
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information provided in the autobiographical account,34 and their decisions are
likely to be influenced by their perception of the genuineness of the complaint.35
Where the complainant’s account does not accord well with the features of the
CSMBS officers are more likely to conclude that the complaint lacks credibility,
or that it is false. This is because many of the beliefs that make up the CSMBS are
contradicted by scientific evidence, leading to faulty judgements of memory-based
evidence. This parallels findings from McMillan and Thomas’36 study in which
they reported that officers were more likely to doubt the complainant’s account
when it lacked detail or contained inconsistencies. This is concerning because
research has shown that doubts about the credibility and reliability of the victim’s
account can negatively affect the investigative effort expended by police37 and
increase the likelihood that a case will fail to proceed further through the criminal
justice system.38 Such a belief system is also likely to perpetuate the “culture of
scepticism”39 which is thought by some to exist amongst police officers towards
rape complaints, and may go some way to explain the police decision-making
which contributes to the high rate of attrition in rape cases which is known to occur
at the police investigation stage.40
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD
While it was previously the case that crime victims had little recourse against the
police if officers decided not to pursue the complaint, or against the CPS if they
decided not to prosecute, an increased acknowledgement of the rights of crime
victims, both domestically41 and internationally,42 has led to advances in this area.
Victims can now seek a review of decisions not to prosecute under the Victims’
Right to Review Scheme43; bring a claim against the police in negligence in limited
34Barrett and Hamilton-Giachritsis, “The victim as a means to an end: detective decision-making in a simulated
investigation of attempted rape” (2013) 10 Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 200, 206.
35 J. Lovett and L. Kelly, Different systems, similar outcomes? Tracking attrition in reported rape cases across
Europe (London: Child and Women Abuse Studies Unit, London Metropolitan University, 2009), p.49; K. Hohl and
E.A. Stanko, “Complaints of rape and the criminal justice system: fresh evidence on the attrition problem in England
and Wales” (2015) 12(3) European Journal of Criminology 324, 337.
36L. McMillan and M. Thomas, “Police interviews of rape victims: tensions and contradictions” in M. Horvarth
and J. Brown (eds), Rape: Challenging contemporary thinking (Devon: Willan Publishing, 2009).
37M.A. Alderden and S.E. Ullman, “Creating a more complete and current picture: examining police and prosecutor
decision-making when processing sexual assault cases” (2012) 18(5) Violence Against Women 525, 527;
HMIC/HMCPSI,Without consent (London: HMIC, 2007); J.M. Brown, C. Hamilton and D. O’Neill, “Characteristics
associated with rape attrition and the role played by scepticism or legal rationality by investigators and prosecutors”
(2007) 13(4) Psychology, Crime and Law 355, 356.
38HMIC, Crime recording: making the victim count (London: HMIC, 2014), p.74; E. Darwinkel, M. Powell and
P. Tidmarsh, “Improving police officers’ perceptions of sexual offending through intensive training” (2013) 40(8)
Criminal Justice and Behavior 895, 896; L. Ellison and V.E. Munro, “Taking trauma seriously: critical reflections
on the criminal justice process” (2017) 21(3) International Journal of Evidence and Proof 183, 189.
39L. Kelly, J. Lovett and L. Regan, A gap or a chasm? Attrition in reported rape cases, Home Office Research
Study No.293 (London: HMSO, 2005), p.83.
40 J. Temkin and B. Krahé, Sexual assault and the justice gap: a question of attitude (Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2008), p.18; Lovett and Kelly, Different systems, similar outcomes? Tracking attrition in reported rape cases across
Europe (London: Child and Women Abuse Studies Unit, London Metropolitan University, 2009); Barrett and
Hamilton-Giachritsis, “The victim as a means to an end: detective decision-making in a simulated investigation of
attempted rape” (2013) 10 Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling 200, 201; L. Kelly, A research
review on the reporting, investigation and prosecution of rape cases (London: HMCPSI, 2002), p.15.
41 For example, in the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (London: Ministry of Justice, 2015).
42For example, in EU Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection
of victims of crime.
43The Court of Appeal decision inChristopher Killick [2011] EWCACrim 1608; [2012] 1 Cr. App. R. 10 prompted
the introduction of the Victims’ Right to Review Scheme by the CPS in 2013. In 2015 the National Police Chiefs’
Council (NPCC) introduced a Victims’ Right to Review Scheme applicable to police decisions not to prosecute.
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circumstances44; and hold the police to account for investigative failures through
complaints made via internal police complaints mechanisms, investigations
conducted by the Independent Office for Police Conduct,45 and references made
to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman.46 With such increased
attention being paid to the interests of crime victims also comes an increased
appetite to understand the way in which key criminal justice decision-makers reach
the decisions that may affect those interests. It is in this respect that research such
as that done by Akhtar et al. may prove particularly useful.
The importance of developing a deeper understanding of police decision-making
in rape cases is also heightened following the Supreme Court’s decision in DSD,
in which the Court concluded that crime victims could successfully claim against
the police where police investigative failures amounted to a breach of their human
rights. As we show in our analysis below, we consider that it is likely that the
CSMBS identified by Akhtar et al. underpinned the problematic police
decision-making identified in that case. With a deeper understanding of the basis
upon which such investigative failures are likely to arise it is anticipated that police
forces will be better able to mitigate the risk of future failures by challenging
officers’ reliance on problematic belief systems through training. Research done
in this area may also prove useful to those representing litigants in future cases by
providing markers against which to identify patterns in police decision-making
which may help to convince the Court that the threshold for liability set in DSD
has or has not been met.
DSD was an appeal by the Commissioner against a finding in the High Court47
in favour of two victims of John Worboys, who is considered to have committed
more than 100 drug and alcohol assisted rapes and sexual assaults between
2002–2008 while working as a black cab driver in the London area. Worboys’
modus operandi was to offer female passengers an alcoholic drink which he had
laced with other intoxicants, as part of a ruse that he was celebrating a financial
windfall. Upon accepting the drink his passengers would often lose consciousness
and it was then that Worboys would sexually assault or rape them.
The two respondents in DSD, DSD and NBV, had been awarded declarations
and damages in the High Court against the police under ss.7 and 8 of the Human
Rights Act 1998 (HRA), on the basis that failures in the investigation of their
Guidance on the CPS scheme can be found at https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/vrr
_guidance_2016.pdf [Accessed 19 July 2019] and on the NPCC scheme at http://operationresolve.co.uk/media/1370
/np_guidance_on_police_victim_right_to_review_feb_2.pdf [Accessed 19 July 2019].
44 In Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1988] Q.B. 60; [1987] 2 W.L.R. 1126 the House of Lords held that
the general duty owed by the police to suppress crime did not carry with it a private law duty in negligence towards
individual members of the public, and that it would be contrary to the public interest to impose such a duty on the
police for mistakes made in their investigation of crime.While this has at times been interpreted as a general immunity
against claims brought in negligence against the police, the Supreme Court in Robinson v Chief Constable of West
Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4; [2018] 2 W.L.R. 595 made it clear that that officers do not have a blanket immunity
against actions brought in negligence. For a discussion of Robinson see R. Gladwin-Geoghegan and S. Foster, “Police
liability in negligence: immunity or incremental liability?” (2018) 23(1) Coventry Law Journal 38.
45The Independent Office for Police Conduct (IOPC) replaced the Independent Police Complaints Commission
in January 2018. The IOPC oversees the police complaints system in England and Wales. Information on the IOPC
can be found at https://www.policeconduct.gov.uk [Accessed 19 July 2019].
46References to the Ombudsman must be made via the victim’s MP. The right to make a complaint to the
Ombudsman is provided by Code 9.4 of the Code of Practice for Victims of Crime (London: Ministry of Justice,
2015). Information on the Ombudsman can be found at https://www.ombudsman.org.uk/ [Accessed 19 July 2019].
47DSD and NBV v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (Admin).
836 Criminal Law Review
[2019] Crim. L.R., Issue 10 © 2019 Thomson Reuters
respective complaints amounted to breaches of art.3 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (ECHR).
Although the text of art.3 sets down a negative obligation upon states to prohibit
state-inflicted torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also interpreted art.3 as placing
ancillary positive obligations upon states. In MC v Bulgaria48 the applicant
complained that the Bulgarian State’s response to her complaint of rape amounted
to a breach of her human rights under arts 3, 8, 13 and 14 because Bulgarian
domestic law and practice did not provide effective protection against rape, and
that the authorities had not properly investigated her complaint.49 The ECtHR found
that there had been a violation of the Bulgarian State’s positive obligations under
arts 3 and 8 and concluded that states have a positive obligation under arts 3 and
8 to “enact criminal law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them
in practice through effective investigation and prosecution.”50
In DSD the Supreme Court recognised that there was a clear line of Strasbourg
authority which had interpreted art.3 as placing a duty on states to properly
investigate complaints of serious criminal violence,51 and that such an approach
was necessary to effectively protect the rights enshrined in the article.52
Unanimously dismissing the Commissioner’s appeal, the SupremeCourt followed
the Strasbourg jurisprudence and held that the positive obligation to effectively
investigate rape complaints applied whether the perpetrator of the rape was a state
actor or a private citizen,53 and that the obligation could be breached by serious
systemic and/or operational failings in the police investigation.54 This last point
proved to be an area of significant disagreement amongst the Justices deciding the
case, with two of the five (Lords Hughes and Mance) preferring to limit the scope
of the judgment to exclude operational failings by individual officers.
The decision inDSD does not spell out exactly how bad the police failures need
to be in order to meet the “egregious and significant” threshold set down by Lord
Kerr,55 but simple errors or isolated omissions will not suffice.56 That said, there
is no requirement that an applicant must show that but for the failures the outcome
of the investigation would have been successful.57
In the High Court Mr Justice Green had extensively detailed the interconnected
serious systemic and operational errors apparent in the police investigations of
DSD and NBV’s complaints,58 and his analysis gives a good indication of the types
of failures that are likely to satisfy in future cases. In his judgment Mr Justice
Green highlighted that officers had failed to follow up obvious evidential leads
such as speaking with independent witnesses, checking CCTV footage to identify
Worboys’ taxi, and in NBV’s case, that officers had failed to search Worboys’
48MC v Bulgaria [2005] 40 E.H.R.R. 20; 15 B.H.R.C. 627.
49MC v Bulgaria [2005] 40 E.H.R.R. 20 at [109]; 15 B.H.R.C. 627.
50MC v Bulgaria [2005] 40 E.H.R.R. 20 at [153]; 15 B.H.R.C. 627.
51For a summary of ECtHR jurisprudence demonstrating the extent of the positive obligation seeO’Keeffe v Ireland
(2014) 59 E.H.R.R. 15 at [144]–[152]; 35 B.H.R.C. 601.
52Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11; [2018] 2 W.L.R. 895 at [24].
53Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11; [2018] 2 W.L.R. 895 at [62].
54Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11; [2018] 2 W.L.R. 895 at [58].
55Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11; [2018] 2 W.L.R. 895 at [29].
56Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11; [2018] 2 W.L.R. 895 at [29].
57 J. Rogers, “Liability for egregiously bad police investigations” (2018) 6 Archbold Review 6, 6.
58DSD and NBV v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 at [243]–[313].
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address and car following his arrest. A culture of scepticism was also identified
as underpinning much of the police decision-making in these cases. This had led
officers to inappropriately discount aspects of the information provided by the
complainants and inadequately challenge the conflicting accounts offered by
Worboys. Officers were also found to have inadequate training and supervision,
particularly in dealing with drug and alcohol induced rapes and sexual assaults,
and to have insufficiently utilised intelligence sources, such as police databases,
which would have been likely to have expeditedWorboys’ apprehension and arrest.
Although officer reliance on the CSMBS was not explicitly highlighted by the
courts considering the case, or by the Independent Police Complaints Commission
in their report of the police inquiry into allegations against Worboys,59 a close
analysis of the case reports and the IPCC report suggests that reliance on the
CSMBS is likely to have played a significant role in the police decision-making
that led to the serious investigative failures.
The general air of scepticism demonstrated by officers towards DSD’s account
centred on her inability to remember what had happened to her, and her presentation
at the police station following the attack in a drunken and/or drugged state.60
Similarly, NBV’s inability to remember details of the attack against her, and her
unusual behaviour captured on CCTV as she left Worboys’ cab, had led officers
to consider that there were inconsistencies in her allegation.61 Indeed, the very
methods used by Worboys to subdue his victims had meant that DSD and NBV
were unable to provide the detailed, vivid and fluent memory accounts which
officers relying on the CSMBS were likely to expect, and this undoubtedly added
to the investigative malaise demonstrated by officers dealing with their complaints.
Unfortunately, this was so despite the fact that the features of the cases that led
officers to question the complainants’ credibility (i.e. the gaps in their memory)
were entirely consistent with their accounts of having been drugged by Worboys.
The significance of the decision in DSD cannot be understated. The fact that
the domestic courts have confirmed that victims of rape can seek redress under
the HRA 1998 for failures in the police’s investigation of their complaints is a
substantial advance to the rights of this group of victims, and has the potential to
place their interests more squarely at the heart of policing objectives in this area.62
That said, the Justices inDSDweremindful to place strict limits on the applicability
of the decision by setting a high threshold for qualifying police failures. This,
along with other limiting factors such as the one-year time limit within which to
raise a claim,63 and the relatively low level of compensation available,64means that
59 Independent Police Complaints Commission, Commissioner’s report: IPCC independent investigation into the
Metropolitan Police Service’s inquiry into allegations against John Worboys (London: IPCC, 2010).
60DSD and NBV v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 (Admin) at [255]–[257],
[278], [292].
61DSD and NBV v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014] EWHC 436 at [308], [263]–[264];
Independent Police Complaints Commission, Commissioner’s report: IPCC independent investigation into the
Metropolitan Police Service’s inquiry into allegations against John Worboys (London: IPCC, 2010), p.10.
62 See Lord Kerr’s dicta in Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD [2018] UKSC 11; [2018] 2 W.L.R.
895 at [71].
63Human Rights Act 1998 s.7(5)(a).
64 J. Rogers, “Liability for egregiously bad police investigations” (2018) 6 Archbold Review 6, 8; K. Harrison,
“Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis v DSD—case comment” (2018) 2 Journal of Personal Injury Law C69,
C74. Also note that in the High Court DSD and NBV were awarded damages in the sums of £22,250 and £19,000
respectively.
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the courts are unlikely to be inundated with cases argued on the basis of the
principles set down in DSD.
Conclusion
Arguably the real legacy of DSD, and the other cases which may seek to follow
it, will be the impact that such highly publicised human rights breaches will have
on the willingness of future rape victims to engage with the criminal justice process.
Any increase in the perceived lack of procedural fairness in the police’s treatment
of rape complaints is likely to negatively affect the willingness of rape victims to
come forward and make a complaint to the police, particularly when this is
accompanied by concerns that the police may not believe their account of what
has happened to them.65 To the extent that the flawed police decision-making in
cases likeDSD is attributable to the CSMBS we should look to work with officers
to challenge their reliance on this memory belief system. We propose that specific
training from memory researchers is needed for police, particularly those officers
who are required to make decisions that will affect the likelihood of a rape case
continuing through the criminal justice system. The benefits of training and
exposure to memory-based materials can clearly be seen in the analysis detailed
above, where we see that the probability of memory researchers holding the SMBS
increase with age and presumably then, experienceworking with and being exposed
to, scientific studies of memory. By training the relevant police officers, we can
hope to reduce the risk of failing those rape victims who do make a complaint to
the police, and to avoid the litigation which may otherwise deter further victims
from bringing their rapes to the police’s attention.
Table 1. Questionnaire sub-topics and associated statements
ItemsSub-Topic
People often accurately remember emotions and feelings1 Memory is generally accu-
rate People generally remember what happened even though some details
may be forgotten, and some remembered inaccurately
People often remember the thoughts they had during a specific experi-
ence
Despite some forgetting and occasional errors memory is generally
accurate
The details in memories of specific events are usually accurate
A memory that has few details is likely to be inaccurate2 The more details the more
accurate the memory A memory that is recalled fluently is likely to be accurate
A memory that is recalled with a lot of vivid and specific details is
highly likely to be accurate
Highly specific details are more likely to be accurate than details that
are less specific
A memory that is recalled hesitantly, with lots of going back and
double takes, is likely to be inaccurate
The more detailed the description of a memory the more accurate the
recollection
Memories containing peripheral information, e.g. surroundings and
background details, are more likely to be accurate
65As recognised by Mr Justice Green in DSD and NBV v The Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2014]
EWHC 436 at [275]. See also J. Jordan, The word of a woman: police, rape and belief (London: Palgrave, 2004);
Kelly, A research review on the reporting, investigation and prosecution of rape cases (London: HMCPSI, 2002),
p.17.
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ItemsSub-Topic
People can come to remember events that never occurred3 Memories can be false
Over time memories deteriorate and can become less accurate
Memories of traumatic memories may contain details that are false
It is possible for a highly vivid, very specific, detail in an account of
a memory to be wholly false
Memories are like photographs or videos4 Memory is like a video
Memory is like a movie of one’s experiences
Memory is like a filing cabinet in which each document records a
specific memory
Experiences that feature very strong emotions are more accurately re-
membered than experiences in which emotions were moderate or weak
5 Emotional intensity and
accuracy
Memories of emotionally negative experiences are more accurately
remembered than memories of neutral and positive experiences
Traumatic experiences can be repressed for many years and then re-
covered
6 Trauma and memory
When someone recalls a memory of childhood sexual abuse, or perhaps
a series of such memories, it will usually be the case that there is at
least some truth to their recall
Memories can be forgotten over many years, even decades, but later
remembered again
Memories of traumatic experiences can be kept out of mind
When a number of people all recall being (separately) abused by a
particular individual or group of individuals, the likelihood that the
abuse occurred is greatly increased
Memories from childhood are as accurate as memories from other ages7 Childhood memory
Children’s memories are less accurate than adult’s memories
Memories of intense emotional experiences are “burnt in the brain”
and are therefore remembered in detail for long periods of time
8 Durability and reliving
trauma
Traumatic memories come to mind in the form of “flashbacks”
A “flashback” of a traumatic memory causes a re-living of the remem-
bered event
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